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EMPLOYERS HUNGRY
FOR NEW MEAL PERIOD REGULATIONS
After months of anticipation for employers hoping to get
relief from California's stringent meal period requirements, the Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") announced that it
would not issue the meal period regulations it proposed in late 2005.
Thus, the rule-making process must start over again.
As we reported in past newsletters, the DLSE had proposed regulations
to clarify the law regarding meal periods, including how an employer
provides a meal period, when the meal period starts, and that payments
made by an employer for failure to provide a meal period are a penalty,
subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and not a wage. This started
a period of public notice and comment, with the DLSE revising the regulations
several times. The DLSE was to file the final version of the regulations
with the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL") on January 13,
2006. Approval by the OAL is the last step in the regulation-making
process.
On January 13, 2006, however, the DLSE abruptly announced that it would
not be filing the regulations with the OAL. Instead, the DLSE announced
that it would fine tune the proposed meal and rest period regulations
and issue a new package of regulations at a later date, thereby beginning
a new rule-making process.
Perhaps the most critical component of the proposed regulations was
the DLSE's position that the one hour of pay provision for a missed
meal or rest break is a penalty, subject to a one-year statute of limitations,
versus a wage, subject to a three or four-year statute of limitations.
The distinction is critical in terms of potential monetary liability
to employees.
With the DLSE's retraction of the proposed regulations, employers must
wait for the courts to decide whether the one hour of pay provision
is a wage or a penalty. The First and Second District Courts of Appeal
in Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions
and Mills v. Superior Court
have held that the payment is a penalty, subject to a one-year statute
of limitations. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in National
Steel and Shipbuilding Company v. Superior Court took the opposite
view, holding that the payment is a wage. The plaintiffs in Kenneth
Cole filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court,
but the court has not yet decided whether to accept review.
Thus, given the DLSE's retraction of the proposed regulations and the
split amongst the Courts of Appeal, employers have to continue to wait
for clear guidance on this issue. In the meantime, employers are advised
to review their meal period policy and practice to ensure compliance
with California law which, among other things, requires that employees
who work more than 5 hours in a day take an unpaid 30-minute uninterrupted
meal break within the first 5 hours of work.
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL RULES THAT EMPLOYERS
CAN DEDUCT PARTIAL DAY ABSENCES FROM EXEMPT EMPLOYEES' VACATION TIME
Both California and federal law contain overtime pay exemptions for
executive, administrative, and professional employees who meet the applicable
"salary basis" and duties tests. To meet the salary basis
test, the employee must receive a salary that is equivalent to at least
two times the state's minimum wage for full-time work ($28,080 per year
in 2006) and the employee's salary cannot be subject to change based
on the quantity or quality of the employee's work.
Under federal law, while employers may not make deductions from an exempt
employee's wages resulting from the employee's partial-day absence for
personal reasons, employers may deduct time for such absences from the
employee's accrued but unused vacation. In the past, the California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") has taken
the position that, unlike the federal rule, California law prohibits
employers from taking partial-day deductions from an employee's vacation
or paid-time-off bank.
The California Court of Appeal, however, in Conley v. Pacific Gas
& Electric (2005) 131 Cal. App. 4th 260, rejected the DLSE's
approach and, instead, adopted the federal rule. The plaintiffs in Conley
sought unpaid overtime, claiming they were improperly classified
as exempt from the overtime laws. In support of their argument, they
pointed to the employer's vacation policy which required exempt employees
to use vacation time for any absence of four hours or more during a
workday. The plaintiffs argued that this violated the salary requirement
because it amounted to a deduction from wages based on the quantity
of work performed. The California Court of Appeal rejected that argument
and held that the employer's policy simply regulated the timing
of exempt employees' use of vacation time.
The key in Conley is that because the plaintiffs were able
to use vacation time for partial day absences, they did not see a dip
in their regular wages and, therefore, there was no reduction in salary.
To be clear, Conley does not stand for the proposition that
an employer can deduct from an exempt employee's wages for partial day
absences. For example, if an exempt employee does not have any vacation
time available and he/she misses a partial day, the employer may not
deduct from the employee's wages. The Conley rule only applies
where the exempt employee has unused vacation time available to cover
the partial day absence.
The Conley decision was not appealed to the California Supreme
Court. As of yet, no other Court of Appeal has ruled on the issue and,
therefore, Conley is binding precedent. Employers, however,
should exercise caution in this area as this is a hotly debated issue
in California.
NEW LAW PERMITS DIRECT DEPOSIT OF FINAL WAGE
PAYMENTS
Recently, the California Legislature passed
Assembly Bill 1093, which changed California's law on the direct deposit
of final wage payments, Section 213 of the Labor Code.
Effective January 1, 2006, if an employee is discharged or quits, the
employer can tender the employee's final wage payment through direct
deposit so long as the employee has previously and voluntarily authorized
the direct deposit of his or her wages. Cal. Labor Code § 213(d)
(2006).
Although prior law permitted an employer to directly deposit wages with
the employee's prior authorization, that authorization was deemed terminated
upon the employee's termination of employment. Accordingly, employers
had to provide all accrued wages at the time of termination through
payroll check.
Although the law now permits the direct deposit of final wage payments,
the law does not change the timing of such payments. For example, under
existing law, when an employee is discharged, the employer must pay
final wages immediately at the time of discharge. If such an employee's
final wage payment is directly deposited, the deposit must comport with
this timing requirement.
Assembly Bill 1093 also modifies Section 213(d) of the Labor Code to
permit the direct deposit of wages in any bank, savings and loan association,
or credit union of the employee's choice "with a place of business
located in this state." The quoted amendment was intended to respond
to an ambiguity in the law that could have been interpreted to require
the financial institution to be headquartered in California.
PROPOSED REGULATIONS SHED LIGHT ON CALIFORNIA'S
MANDATORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT TRAINING LAW
California law requires employers doing business in California, and
who have 50 or more employees, to provide sexual harassment prevention
training for supervisors. This law, A.B. 1825, requires a minimum of
two hours of training, every two years, for all employees with any supervisory
or managerial authority over California workers. Newly hired or promoted
supervisors have to be trained within six months of assuming their supervisory
position. The first round of training had to be completed by December
31, 2005.
On December 16, 2005, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC)
issued proposed regulations shedding light on the specific requirements
of A.B. 1825. The proposed regulations were open for public comment
until February 10, 2006, and are subject to further revision before
becoming final. Nevertheless, the proposed regulations provide employers
with important guidance. Key aspects of the proposed regulations are
highlighted as follows:
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A.B. 1825 applies to employers "engaged in any business or enterprise"
in California with 50 or more employees. As currently drafted, the regulations
do not require that the 50 employees all work at the same location or
that they all reside in California.
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The proposed regulations adopt the broad definition of "supervisor"
found in the Fair Employment and Housing Act, which includes the ability
"to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or the responsibility to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend that
action…if the exercise of that authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."
Importantly, supervisory employees do not need to be physically located
in California as long as they supervise California employees.
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The proposed regulations also provide employers with "desirable"
and "undesirable" qualities for an effective trainer or educator,
detail the areas in which the trainer or educator must be knowledgeable,
and specify the content, duration and acceptable methods of the mandatory
training.
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A.B. 1825 requires employers to train supervisors once every
two years. The proposed regulations provide employers with guidance
on how to manage compliance. Under the "Individual" tracking
method, employers may track the training requirement for each supervisor,
measured two years from the date of completion of the individual supervisor's
last training. Under the "Training Year" tracking method,
employers may designate a "training year" in which they train
their supervisors and must again retrain the supervisors by the end
of the next "training year," two years later.
Although subject to modification until they become final, the proposed
regulations answer many questions that previously were unanswered, providing
employers with significant guidance on California's mandatory sexual
harassment prevention training law.
RUN, DON'T WALK TO WORK: COMPENSABLE TIME UNDER THE FLSA
Allegations of "off the clock" work have become fertile ground
for wage and hour class action litigation. The issue is the scope of
the compensable workday -- when does it begin, when does it end, and
perhaps most importantly, what constitutes "work" that must
be paid?
The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed these questions in the IBP,
Inc. v. Alvarez case, and, in doing so, articulated an expansive
scope of the compensable workday for many production employees. In Alvarez,
the Court held that, under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
employers must pay workers for the time it takes them to put on (don)
and take off (doff) unique protective clothing required for their job,
and the time it takes them to walk between their work stations and changing
areas.
In Alvarez, employees of IBP, a meat processing plant in Washington,
were required to wear company-provided protective gear to do their jobs.
IBP employees stored their gear in company locker rooms, where they
put on and took off the gear at the beginning and end of each shift.
IBP paid its employees beginning with the first piece of meat processed
each shift and ending with the last piece of meat processed, plus four
minutes each day for time spent changing clothes.
The employees brought a class action lawsuit to recover back wages for
all time spent changing into and out of the protective gear and for
the time spent walking between the locker rooms and work stations. Also
at issue in a companion case before the Court was whether the workers
were entitled to compensation for the time spent waiting to obtain safety
equipment from the company facility. The Court ruled that donning and
doffing protective gear is compensable, as is the time spent walking
between the changing and production areas. The Court ruled that time
spent waiting to receive gear before the shift begins was not compensable.
In reaching its decisions, the Court relied on the U.S. Department of
Labor's regulations defining the workday as the "period between
the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee's
principal activity or activities." The Court reasoned that, at
least in this particular case, time spent changing into and out of protective
gear was "integral and indispensable" to the production workers'
"principal activity." In addition, the Court held that the
time spent walking between the locker room and production floor was
compensable as part of the employees' "continuous workday."
Time spent waiting to don and doff protective gear, however, was not
a principal activity and, therefore, not compensable work time.
The Alvarez case is likely to receive significant attention
by union and plaintiffs' attorneys and is a reminder to employers to
re-examine their pay policies to minimize exposure to "off the
clock" claims.
NEW USERRA REGULATIONS ARE NOW IN EFFECT
On January 18, 2006, the new regulations of the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 ("USERRA")
went into effect. USERRA provides employment and reemployment rights
for members of the uniformed services who leave their civilian jobs
for military service. These rights include the ability to return to
their civilian jobs after uniformed service with the same pay, benefits,
and status they would have attained had they not been away on duty.
USERRA also prohibits employers from discriminating against these individuals
in employment because of their military service.
Prominent among these rights under USERRA is the right to reinstatement
under the "escalator principle." This means that employees
must be reinstated to the position they would have attained if their
employment had not been interrupted (i.e., with the same seniority,
rate of pay, level of vacation benefits, pension benefits, etc., that
the employee would otherwise have been entitled to had he/she not been
on military leave). Returning uniformed service members are also entitled
to the same leave benefits as are provided for other employees, and
must receive the same medical benefits for the first 30 days of their
military leave and, thereafter, can elect COBRA-like coverage for up
to 24 months. Finally, returning employees from military service can
only be discharged for cause for a period of either 180 days or one
year after their return, depending on their length of military service.
The U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") has published a final
version of the notice that employers are now required to post to inform
employees of their rights under USERRA. That poster is available at
www.dol.gov.
CHANGES TO CALIFORNIA'S COMPUTER SOFTWARE
PROFESSIONAL EXEMPTION
Employers are reminded that the pay minimum for the California computer
software employee exemption ("Computer Professional Exemption")
from overtime went up to $47.81 per hour effective January 1, 2006.
(The minimum pay requirement for this exemption is adjusted every year.)
The California Legislature also modified the Computer Professional Exemption
so that employers may pay such employees a salary (as opposed to an
hourly wage) in limited situations. It is now permissible to pay an exempt
Computer Professional the annualized full-time salary equivalent of
$47.81 per hour, if in each workweek the employee receives not less
than $47.81 per actual hour worked and the employee meets the other
requirements of the exemption. (The requirements for the Computer Professional
Exemption in California are substantially more stringent than federal
law.)
For employers that have not recently audited the overtime status of
their exempt employees, now may be a prudent time. We expect more litigation
in this area in 2006, and also anticipate changes in the interpretation
of California's Computer Professional Exemption.
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